SOCIAL JUSTICE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

George Katrougalos

Abstract

This article is based on a lecture given in the framework of a seminar sponsored by the European Commission and the Center of European Constitutional Law-Tsatsos Foundation, on the role of European Union in the field of human rights protection in the Third World.  This explains the emphasis on the “European model” of development. Still, the scope of the article is broader. It attempts to highlight the divergent paradigms of human rights protection in connection to the mechanisms of the market.

The European model in a globalized world

The triumph of the market mechanisms, after the collapse of the rival economic system, has accelerated the process of globalization. Suddenly, after the collapse of the competition between market-driven and state-commanded economies, the developing countries seem to have only one option to follow for modernization and development. A parallel political evolution has resulted in what is called “common western legal civilization.”[1]  Liberal democracy also does not seem to have any serious competitors.  Given this monolithic economic and political framework, where does a European model that includes social and economic rights fit?

The difference between European and the American case lies in the social aspects of the European model. According to the European Commission, the constitutive values of the model are democracy, human rights, freedom of collective negotiations, a market economy, equality of opportunity, social welfare, and solidarity.[2] The model is also defined as a combination of economic performance and social solidarity, based on social consensus and negotiations between the major segments of society. [3] The difference between the American and the European paradigms are not restricted to the divergences of welfare state organization, but it has far reaching consequences for the overall structure of the legal system and the legitimacy of the institutions. The basic, distinctive characteristics of the European Constitutional Order are the recognition of affirmative rights and consequent obligations of the State as well as a more substantive conceptualization of equality. In Europe, due to the legacy of the social revolutions of the nineteenth century (especially the 1848 Revolution) and the special weight of the labor movement in this century, the fundamental freedoms and the social rights are not conceived in linear correlation to the right to property.

However, in the American tradition the right to property offers the conceptual mold for all other rights, thereby encouraging people to translate all sorts of claims into property claims and conceptualizing them as conditions of exchange of equivalents.[4] The European model is based on a wider range of supportive values. The most crucial of these values, resulting from neo-Kantian influences, are captured by the phrase “freedom-property-human dignity.”[5] In Europe, states not only have negative obligations but also a compelling, positive responsibility to protect and to promote the fundamental rights.[6] This responsibility involves undertaking new, general functions of the public power.[7]  As R. Aron remarked, “the concept of State and law is not any more merely negative, but also positive, in the sense that the law is considered to be not only the juridical foundation but also the source of the material conditions for its fulfillment.”[8]

Is the European, “broader” concept of social rights compatible with the new global situation with the domination of market, or will there be a shift of paradigm towards a form of purer economic liberalism?  In order to analyze this we will briefly examine the relation between market, development and well being, before assessing the influence of different systems of values on the economic efficiency of the new rising economies.

 

Market and Development

The economic competitiveness of the European model

Recently, Europeans have developed a wide spread fear of lagging behind the US due to the “sclerosis” of its welfare structures. Actually, some statistical data show that Europe, unlike US and Japan, has lost the ability to create new jobs. The European unemployment rate is almost double than the American one. More importantly, its percentage of long-term (over one year) unemployment is eight times bigger.  In the 1990’s, it was only 6% in the US and 46% in the European Union. Further, the rate of employment growth (creation of new jobs) for the period 1970-1992 was 49% and 9%, respectively.[9]  It has become almost axiomatic among European analysts that the comparative advantage of the US lies in the flexibility of its market, or, less complimentarily, in its inherent greater social inequality.[10]

In an effort to articulate the European answer to the employment stagnation and to improve long-run competitiveness, the Commission presented, in 1993, a White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment. It claims that the labor markets do not work efficiently because of a lack of flexibility, particularly in terms of the organisation of working time, pay and mobility. [11]  For the Commission,

“This rigidity is the root cause of what are relatively high labour costs, which have risen at a much greater rate in the Community than among its principal trading partners. . . . Social protection schemes have - in part at least - had a negative impact on employment, in that they have, in the main, tended to protect people already in work, making their situation more secure and consolidating certain advantages. They have in effect proved to be an obstacle to the recruitment of job seekers or of new entrants to the labour market.”[12]

Although it also advocates the promotion of active labour policies, the White Book embraces, essentially, a neo-liberal strategy oriented to the reform of the labor market through the introduction of greater flexibility in the organisation of work, the distribution of working time, and the reduction of labour costs by the cut-back of employers’ contributions to the social security systems.[13]  However, this rush to imitate the “Great American Job Machine”[14] underestimates some crucial facts regarding the comparative performance of the two systems.[15]

For instance, the productivity growth for the same period is considerably greater in the European Community than in the States: 21% for the US and 72 % for the EU. In these two decades, the US economy has in real terms grown by 70% --fairly less than the Community’s growth of 81%.  Moreover, the European model scores also positive results with regard to the index of inequality: the earnings of the lowest decile European workers represent 67% of the median earnings, in comparison with a 38% for the American ones.[16] In comparison, in the US inequalities increased over the past decade: the earnings of the lowest decile American diminished, relative to the median, by 11 per cent.[17]  Further, while the share of wealth held by the top fifth of US households went up to 48.2% of nation’s income in 1996, the bottom fifth survived on 3.6% of it and the middle fifth on 4.4%.[18]  Thus, the low paid, low qualified jobs become dead-end traps.[19]  Lower productivity of labour force and high social inequality jeopardises economic development, for the post-industrial economies are knowledge driven, depending on the education and the skills of the work force.[20] Hence, the generation of jobs is not enough by itself to justify the abandonment of the European model or the imposition of draconian rollbacks in the social protection systems.  The Scandinavian countries, where the employment rates, defined as the proportion of the population of working age that is actually employed, remained consistently above 70%, exemplify an alternative strategy.  The median European rate is below 60% while the US has hardly ever reached anything near the Scandinavian rates. A paradigm of high economic performance combined with a high level of social services sharply contrasts to the British labor-market flexibility-policies, which did not have similar positive results in combating unemployment.

 Development indicators and well-being

Moreover, to recognize, eventually, the role and efficiency of the market mechanism to some economic areas is not the same thing as seeing it as a general panacea. The curtailment of regulatory powers of national authorities, while broadening possibilities for the free play of market forces, undermines existing social bonds and safety nets of protection, and, ultimately, jeopardizes the security of the less privileged strata of the population. According to the Research Institute for Social Development of the United Nations  (UNRISD) for most people, the extraordinary attempt of the past two decades to deregulate and privatize the economy has produced less, rather than greater well being.[21]  This stems from the fact that the economic development is not always concomitant with greater welfare of the median individual, as the gross national product’s (GNP) growth is not a sufficient indicator to measure the level of security and the quality of life of people.  Other policy matters, such as the existence of a network of social services, health care and public education, are quite central. The European social state, for instance, which guarantees health care by universal schemes for nearly everybody contrasts sharply with the absence of universal coverage of health services in the United States, which leads to astonishing and unexpected results.[22]  For instance, with regard to children vaccination, the USA rank 31st in the World, after countries like India and Botswana.[23]

Due to the inadequacy of the traditional economic indices to reflect the actual well being of the population, some scholars propose the production of alternative methods of evaluation, such as an annual quality of life report, designed to measure the public performance in producing good lives for the citizens.[24]  The UN have already created an index like that, the “Human Development Index,” calculated on the basis of longevity (life expectancy at birth), knowledge (adult literacy plus years of schooling) and income. Surprisingly (or maybe not), according to this index, the US, although undeniably the wealthiest nation in the world, ranks only third (1999 data), after countries having lower GNP but also having better organised welfare states.[25]

What is more revealing from surveys like that, is the fact that the persistence of inequality of the distribution of income contributes to widening the gap between various ethnic groups.  Hence, the African Americans, taken alone, would rank 31st and Hispanics 35th in the world.[26]  It seems also that extreme inequalities result in exclusion and alienation from basic social goods, such as education, which affect all human rights and form a vicious circle of social polarisation.[27]  Signs of this vicious circle are the rate of children living in poverty, which is in US is four times that of Europe, and the extremely high rate of prisoners (426 per 10.000), compared with only 77 in UK and Germany.  Finally, unhindered markets do not only produce inequalities. The lack, for instance, of an efficient regulation on environmental protection could be disastrous in the long term not only for the sustainability of the growth but also for the ecosystem as whole.  In other areas, as in bioethics, as well, market economies could influence the future of mankind in unimaginative, Faustian ways.

Values Supporting Human Rights and Conflicting Scenarios

The process of development, consequently, is strictly related to a choice of values that would direct the orientation of the effort of every nation. There are various “models” and scenarios for the alternate options, which, of course, are not ideologically neutral but offer a political interpretation of the dilemma.  I am going to refer only briefly to two of them, very commonly shared and, therefor- fairly well known, and more extensively to a third one, which tends to be dominant in some of the developing countries.

Fukuyama’s End of History. According to this well-known and probably highly exaggerated thesis, we have already witnessed the end of history as the triumph of western liberal capitalism does not allow any substantial ideological alternatives. The western democracies represent the ``end point of mankind's ideological evolution'' and hence the ``final form of human government'.'[28]

Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations.  The second perspective is located, prima facie, in the antipodes of the previous one. Huntington recognizes that because of the multiplicity of world values there is inevitably a clash between the major civilizations of the world (West, Islam, China, “the Orthodox world,” Africa, South America, India and Japan). The reassertion by non-Westerners of their own cultures does not result in a uniform world but rather in a mosaic where the western hegemony will inevitably weaken.[29]

Both theorisations could be read as variations of an argument on the supremacy of the western civilisation.  This is not so evident in Huntington as in Fukuyama, due to the former’s Spengler-like prophesies for the decline of the West.  Still, Huntington’s model is, in the end, just stressing the uniqueness and the superiority of the western societies vis-à-vis all others which, despite their urge to modernisation, are functionally unable to embrace core concepts of the western world, such as the rule of law and representative democracy. Both models do not take into account the dynamics of the globalisation process, which does not only expand the dominant market paradigm and erodes traditional values but also creates new contradictions and confrontations, which, in turn, contribute to the interaction between cultures.  Besides, the problem of multiculturalism is not present only at the global level, but it has been already transposed in the interior of the greater western states. Even there, it is not limited to the issue of integration and/or differentiation of immigrants and national minorities, but it penetrates all spheres of private and public life, resulting to the recognition of a general right to difference.[30]

Still, the best refutation of the arguments on the uniqueness and non-exportability of “western” democracy and human rights is offered by the development of modern constitutionalism. Since the eighteenth century, the constitution was generally considered as a product of enlightenment and rationalism that empowered the people against authoritarianism.  For the same reasons, in the era of decolonization it was seen not only as a vehicle of liberation, but also as one of modernisation and democratisation.  In the twentieth century, contemporary constitutionalism has been shaped within the confines of the rivalry between two rival systems, western democracies and socialist regimes. One of the central themes of the ideological discourse was the differentiation of “real” (=social and economic) and “formal” (civil and political) freedoms.[31]  After the fall of the socialist systems, a synthesis of these presumably antithetic values were easier to achieve, although the axis of confrontation seemed to move from East-West to North-South.[32]

In the framework of the UN Conference of Vienna (1993), practically all the members of the UN have endorsed a viable compromise on this issue and reaffirmed their support to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which in 1948 had been voted on only by the Western Countries.  The former communist states and countries like Saudi Arabia had abstained.  Nowadays, however, there is a universal --at least nominal-- acceptance of the principle of democracy, not in the formal sense but in a substantive one embodying also the principle of human rights’ protection.[33] The examples of countries like India or South Africa show that the respect of the essence of fundamental rights is not incompatible with the respect of local values and cultures. Illustrative in this sense is the article 21 of the new Nigerian Constitution of 1999, according to which “The State shall protect, preserve and promote the Nigerian cultures which enhance human dignity and are consistent with the fundamental objectives (of the Constitution).”

Mahathir Mohammed’s Way to Development.  The process of constitutional convergence, however, is neither linear nor unilateral.  Political elites of Third World countries emphasise their cultural diversity and the existence of peripheral values, which purportedly contradict western ideas of liberty. This approach lies at the antipodes of Huntington’s model.  According to Huntington, the developing countries are not apt to adopt and implement a consistent human rights policy. The argument now is that the latter could represent a hindrance for economic development. I label this series of policies and argumentation “Mahathir Mohammed’s model,” named after Malaysia’s Prime Minister who is one of its most known spokesmen.

 

Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohammed usually attacks the prevailing definition of human rights “as formulated by Western nations after World War II when much of the world were their colonies.” [34]  He alleges also that "developed countries can do with weak governments or no government, but developing countries cannot function without strong authority,” whereas “liberal forms prescribed by the West would retard their development and continue the economic dependence.”  Other politicians, like Lee Kuan Yew, the former Prime Minister of Singapore, argue in favour of some kind of "true democracy" that contrasts with the standard democratic forms of multi-party systems, liberal guarantees etc.[35]  So, according to these assumptions, human rights and democracy not only can hinder economic performance, but they also go against non-western cultures, in particular, against "Asian values," which are supposed to be more collective and less individualistic.[36] These values are closely related to the Confucian tradition of order, work discipline, ethics, responsibility, and collectivism. President Wee of Singapore suggested four Asian values: "placing society above self, up-holding the family as the basic building block of society, resolving major issues rough consensus instead of contention, and stressing racial and religious tolerance and harmony."[37]

A variation of this position is the thesis shared by some countries of the Third World that the implementation of the social rights is a prerequisite for realising the civil and political ones.[38]  This point of view is true and logical in a sense (a starved man can not think of any other rights).  However, it can easily serve as an alibi for not implementing the “traditional” freedoms and, thus, justify authoritative policies. The hypocrisy of the argument is exposed when propositions of the International Labor Organization or the Word Trade Organization for introducing a link between trade and labor and social security standards are denounced as protectionist measures in favor of the Westerners, threatening to deprive these countries of their comparative advantage, i.e. the low labor cost.[39]


Rights and Economic Development

The real issue is broader than the traditional confrontation about the universality or relativity of human rights.  It is not really relevant if all human rights are essentially the same everywhere, rooted in some transcendent value or dignity of the human person or if there are specific Asian or Islamic values.[40]   The basic question is if it is possible to promote cross-cultural “universals,” such as democracy, equality and social justice, without impeding development and economic growth.[41]  Any undisputed evidence does not support the alleged hindrance of democracy and human rights to economic growth.  Some surveys note a weakly negative relation (especially in countries like South Korea, Singapore and other “Asian tigers”), whereas others find a strongly positive one in states, like Botswana, which managed to combine democracy and development.[42]  It seems, therefore, that the argument considering authoritarianism as the motor of economic development is unsubstantiated.

Moreover, even the second variation of the “Mahatir’s argument”, namely the purported secondary importance of individual and political rights vis-à-vis the social one, is not justified. There is no hierarchy between human rights.[43]  They are all of equal importance and complementary. The violation of one category can not leave any others unaffected.[44]  The non-hierarchical interdependence of rights is justified not on dogmatic, juridical ground, such as the formal equality of rights.  Nor is it just a political axiom.  Recent empirical researches in the developing countries have proved that there is a positive correlation between the respect of fundamental civil and political rights and economic development.[45]  According to an impressive comparative study, covering 147 states during the period 1980-1988, the basic precondition for democracy is not primarily a high level of wealth but rather the relatively equal distribution of resources among the different sections of the population.[46]  These findings show the relation between political and social rights (a basic function of which is the fair redistribution of the resources) without connecting the democratisation process of the developing countries to prior achievement of high levels of development.[47]

In another recent survey of the democratisation process in several developing countries, Z. Arat suggests that the respect of political and individual rights is not a sufficient condition for consolidating democratic regime if it is not accompanied by an effort of promotion of the social ones.[48]   In the inverse case, during an initial phase, there is, indeed, an expansion of political rights.  However, in a second phase, as the social rights lag behind, enthusiasm about political participation begins to stabilise and then drop.  Finally, as the discontent among the population arises, the regimes tend to take depressive measures that trigger a chain reaction of coercive policies, seriously jeopardising the democratic reforms and the political rights.

The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action[49] (1993) has therefor rightfully proclaimed that “all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person.”[50] “Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.”[51] “All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated.”[52]

The Right To Development

The political pressure of the Third World resulted in the recognition by the United Nations of a new, international social right of  nations: the right to the development.  It is an individual and a collective right[53] of the so-called “third generation,”[54] for instance, the right to peace or to the self-determination of the peoples. It was confirmed for the first time in the article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stating that "everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised"  In 1969, the UN General Assembly proclaimed the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, stipulating that "all peoples and all human beings (...) shall have the right (...) to enjoy the fruits of social progress and should, on their part, contribute to it."[55]

Obviously, this right remains nebulous.[56]  From an economical and a political point of view, it is evident that the inequality and exclusion within countries is related to the inequality between rich and poor nations.[57]  Still, at the juridical level, which would be the corresponding obligations of a right to development and who is their holder?  This right could have a meaning only if the international community were in the institutional position to bear responsibilities, commitments and competence far more important than these were.  Under the present situation, however, it constitutes more of a political declaration of principle than a genuine right.  Thus, it should be considered, at most, as an objective rule of the international law, a guiding principle for a “sustainable development.”  As such, it should at least guide nations to consider economic growth through environmental requirements and limitations.  In other words, “the balance between economic efficiency and social justice in a growth-oriented, equitable and sustainable growth.”[58] However, the UN World Conference of Copenhagen emphasised that the priorities for the development lay primarily at the national level, by declaring ”that social development is a national responsibility, the full success of which cannot be achieved without the collective commitment and efforts of the international community.”[59]

The role of the international community should be central in fostering a democratic way of development with respect to social justice, sustainability and equality. There are initiatives in this direction at international level, as, for instance, the so called “20/20 Initiative” by UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF for Achieving Universal Access to Basic Social Services ­for Sustainable Human Development.  Taking into account that attaining universal access to basic social services would require over the rest of the decade additional spending in the amount of some $30-40 billion per annum, this proposal suggests that developing countries and donor countries should agree on a global compact: for the former to increase their current level of public spending on basic social services from the current approximate average level of 13 per cent to about 20 per cent on average, which would yield two thirds of the required amount of resources; and for donors to increase aid allocations to basic social services also to about 20 per cent on average which could yield the remaining one third of the required resources.

Conclusion

Instead of an impossible conclusion, it would be useful to stress again the basic assumptions that this article tried to articulate: (a) it is possible to ensure simultaneously human rights protection and development;  (b) a prerequisite for that is to guarantee the equal respect of all fundamental rights, both the traditional freedoms and rights and the social and economic ones;  (c) it is possible to conciliate, for these purposes, local values and cultures and the basics of modern constitutionalism.


[1] Cf. P.Häberle, Die öffne Gesellschaft der Verfassungsinterpreten, JZ 1975.297.

[2] Commission of European Communities, European Social Policy, COM (94) final, Brussels 7.7.94, p. 2, 3.

[3] J.J. Delors, (Defending the European Model of Society, in Commission of the European Communities, DG V, Combating Social Exclusion, Fostering  Integration, Brussels, 1992, p. 49) defines this model as “a mixed economy, with participation of all citizens, that combines the market with the state steering and the social dialogue.”  For a further discussion on the European Social model see also M. Aubry Pour une Europe sociale, Rapport au ministre des Affaires  Sociales et de l'emploi, Paris, 1988, Ol. Dutheilet de  Lamothe, Du traité de Rome au Traité de Maastricht: La longue marche de  l'Europe sociale, Dr. Soc. 1993.194, 196, Ch. Charpy , L'Europe sociale, une priorité pour la France, Dr. S.  1988. 413, J. van Langendock, The role of Social Security Systems in the completion of the European Market, Acta Hospitalia, no 1/1991.35-57.

[4] Cf. on that N. Fraser and L. Gordon, “Civil Citizenship against social citizenship? On the ideology of contract-versus-charity,” in B. van Steenbergen (ed.), The Condition of Citizenship, Sage, London, 1994, p. 90 ff.

[5] See L. Basta, “Constitutions and Peace within states: Minorities, human rights and welfare state,” General Report for the 4th World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Tokyo, 1995, p. 8 Cf. E. Denninger, “Vielfalt, Sicherheit und Solidarität, Ein neues Paradigma für Verfassungsgebung und Menchenrechtsentwicklung,“ in E. Denninger, Menschenrechte und Grundgesetz, Beltz, Athenaum, Weinheim, 1994. 13,  A. Baldassare, “Liberta, Problemi generali,” Enciclopedia Giuridica, Enciclopedia Italiana,. XIX,  Roma, 1988, pp. 16-23.

[6] On the contrary, American constitutional theory is very reluctant to recognise affirmative constitutional rights.  The initial position of the jurisprudence regarded them not as subjective, enforceable rights but as largesse, “gratuities” of the state, i.e. a kind of public charity. (See Lynch v. United States, 292 US 571, 577 (1934), compare Thompson v. Gleason, 317 F. 2d 901, 906 (1962). See for further discussion Charles Reich, “The new property,” Yale Law Journal 5, 1964.733.)  Moreover, the affirmative action is not conceived as an obligation of the state in order to promote the substantive equality, but rather as a sui-generis collective compensation for the injustices of the past.  Therefor, its foundation is not the recognition of a right, but the “victimisation” of the recipients Cf. S. Steele, The Content Of Our Character, A New Vision Of Race In America, St. Martin Press, N. York, 1990, P. Rosanvallon, La Nouvelle Question Sociale, Seuil, Paris, 1995, p. 64 ff.  For a further discussion see G. Katrougalos, Constitution, Law And Rights In The Welfare State… And Beyond, A. Sakkoulas, Athens, 1998, Part II, Chapter 1.

[7] See the related jurisprudence of the German BverfGE about the “Teilhaberechte” in G. Katrougalos.

[8] R. Aron, Etudes Politiques, p. 242.    

[9] See the White Book on growth, competitiveness, and employment - The challenges and ways forward into the 21st century, COM(93) 700 final, Brussels, 5 December 1993, also OECD, Employment Outlooks, Paris, 1993 .

[10] See J. Myles, “The future of the Welfare in Canada and the US,” in The Future of Welfare,  Social Forskings Institutet’ special publication for the World Summit for  Social Development, 1995, p. 13G, Esping Andersen G., “After the golden age: The future of the Welfare State in the new global order,” UNRISD, Geneva, 1995, p. 14, N. Fraser, “The Evaluation Of The Strategy Of Promoting Low Pay As A Means To Employment Growth,” Paper for the Conference on Labour Market Policies in Europe, Roskilde University, 29/9/1994.

[11] Katrougalos, Constitution, Law And Rights In The Welfare State… And Beyond , Chapter 8.

[12] Katrougalos, Constitution, Law And Rights In The Welfare State… And Beyond.

[13] The minimal standards of the European social legislation are considered just as “a large framework of action”. UNICE, the federation of European employers,  is constantly hostile to any minimum standards that could harm flexibility and the “natural rhythm” of the market. Accordingly, the employers wish that most of the social legislation stay out of the European regulation. See the UNICEF’s Report on the Green Book of the Commission, in Commission des Communautés Européennes, COM (94) 333 final/2, Synthèse des Réponses, Bruxelles, 27/7/1994.

[14] The White Book adamantly denies that it embraces the American paradigm. Still,  the adoption of flexible policies of large scale inevitably leads to this road.

[15] Cf. F. Vergara, Les chiffres trompeurs du chômage, Le Monde diplomatique - janvier 1997.17, M. Boskin, « Prisoners of Faulty Statistics, The Wall Street Journal Europe, Bruxelles, 6-7 décembre 1996, S. Halimi, Éternel retour du " miracle américain" Le Monde diplomatique - janvier 1997.16, International Comparisons of Unemployment Indicators, Monthly Labor Review, Washington, March 1993.3.

[16] See N. Fraser, N. Fraser and L. Gordon, “Civil Citizenship against social citizenship? On the ideology of contract-versus-charity, “ table 2.

[17] OECD, Employment Outlooks, Paris, 1993. Cf. L. Wacquant,  La généralisation de l'insécurité salariale en Amérique, Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales, Paris, décembre 1996.

[18] US Census Bureau Statistics, as quoted by R. Blanpain, Social Dialogue, Economic Interdependence and labor law, Reports to the 6th European Congress for Labor Law and Social Security, Warsaw, 1999, p. 67.

[19] Esping Andersen G., “After the golden age: The future of the Welfare State in the new global order,” p. 15.

[20] See J. Myles, The future of the Welfare in Canada and the US, in The Future of Welfare, Social Forskings Institutet’ special publication for the World Summit for Social Development, 1995, p. 13.

[21] UNRISD, The Crisis of Social Development in the 1990s:Preparing for the World Social Summit, Report of the UNRISD 30th Anniversary Conference, Geneva, 7-8 July 1993.

[22]  See on that the remarks of Amartya Sen, “Political elements in economic development: A tribute to Andrea,” The First Andreas Papandreou Memorial Lecture, Athens, and Tuesday, 20 October 1998.

[23] 1991 data, as cited by Cass Sunstein, “Well-Being and the State,” Harvard Law Review, vol. 107, 1994.1303,

[24]  Sunstein, “Well-Being and the State,” p. 1304

[25]  It is characteristic that in the 1991 Index USA were ranked sixth.

[26]  Sunstein, “Well-Being and the State,” p. 1321.

[27] The access to the legal system is an important social good, which is often neglected in the analysis of poverty. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, “It is not only a significant aspect of well-being in itself, but can also be essential to the enforcement of economic rights. Much misery and deprivation originates from human exploitation either by private groups or by the state. (...) Economic and social justice has been hindered by the inadequacy of the judicial system.”  Inter-American Development Bank, Office of the President, Social Tensions and Social Reform, Toward balanced Economic, financial and social policies in Latin America, Washington D.C., 1995, pp. 42 ff.

[28] F. Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest, 1989.

[29] S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Touchstone Books, 1997, the same, “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century,” Julian J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture Series, Vol. 4, 1993, cf. M. Kelley, The Impulse of Power: Formative Ideals of Western Civilization, Contra Mundum Books, 1999.

[30] Cf., among others, Amy Gutmann (ed.) Multiculturalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994.

[31] Illustrative is the fact that the right to property is practically omitted in the UN Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, because of the disagreement regarding how extended should be its protection.

[32] See, e.g., R. Kothary, “Rights as a North South Issue,” in Claude, R. P. and Weston, B. H.  (eds.), Human Rights in the World Community, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1989, p. 134.

[33] See Ph. Ardent, Institutions politiques et droit constitutionnel, LGDJ, Paris, 1997, no 22, J. Chevallier, L’ Etat de droit, Montchrestien, Clefs, Paris, 1999, p. 54, G. Kassimatis, Commentary of the Constitution, A. Sakkoulas, Athens, 1999, Article 1, nr. 168.

[34] See, for instance, his speech at a conference of the  Just World Trust in Kyala Lumpur, 6/12/1994, quoted by  T. C. Tan, “Rethinking Human Rights,” University of Technology, Malaysia, Koala Lumpur, article posted in the Internet list PSRT-L, 8/12/1994

[35] A. Sen, “Political elements in economic development.”

[36] Cf. the Bangkok Declaration of April 1993, where the Asian governments stressed "the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds." These famous “Asian values” which bring up the connection of duties to rights and the stress of collectivism versus individualism are also reflected on the wording of the Constitutions. For instance, in the Taiwan’s Constitution of 1946 the articles on human rights protection begin with the phrase “The people shall have freedom of…” without reference to the person or the individual.

[37] Quoted by Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order , p. 319, also pp. 108-109.

[38] See, for instance, the speeches of Nigeria’s, Pakistan’s and Mexico’s delegates in the UN Assembly in 1992, all emphasising the priority of social rights vis-à-vis the civil rights, in order to create stability and encourage democracy. They all stated that the right to development strengthened individual freedoms and not the other way around. (Quoted in Human Rights and Development, Published by the United Nations Department of Public Information, DPI/1275-92868-November 1992.) Cf. Kothary R. “Rights as a North South Issue,” in Claude, R. P. and Weston, B. H.  (eds.), Human Rights in the World  Community, University of Pennsylvania Press,  Philadelphia, 1989.134.

[39] Cf. Gross, Report on the Word Trade Organization and Social Rights, Explanatory Memorandum, Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, and Doc. 7682, 1996.

[40] Cf., among others, J. Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1989.

[41] See A. D. Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism, Sage, London, 1990, p. 61 ff. Actually, contemporary cultural anthropology has found many transcultural similarities among different cultures. Cf. D. J. Puchala, “The Ethics of Globalism,” The 1995 John W. Holmes Memorial Lecture, ACUNS, Brown University, Reports and Papers, 1995, No. 3, L. Kohlberg, “From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development." in T. Mischel, (ed.) Cognitive Development and Epistemology. Academic Press, New York, 1971.

[42] See, among others, A. Sen, “Political Elements In Economic Development.”

[43] However, a part of the theory accepts if not the existence of a natural hierarchy between the two categories of rights, at least an inherent difference regarding their implementation’s measures: The social rights are supposed to be less “justiciable” than the traditional freedoms. See, for instance, D. Türk, „The U.N. and the realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,“ in F. Matscher (ed.), Die Durchsetzung wirtschaftlicher und sozialer Grundrechte: eine rechtsvergleichende Bestandaufnahme, Engel Verlag, Kehl am Rhein, 1991,  p. 95, V. Kartashkin, „Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,“ in K. Vasek, Ph. Alston (eds.), The International Dimension Of Human Rights, UNESCO, 1982.112.       

[44] Cf. Ar. Manessis, Constitutional Rights, Sakkoulas, Thessaloniki, 1982, pp. 23 ff. (in Greek).

[45] See P. Das Gupta, Well-Being And The Extent Of Its Realisation In Poor Countries, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993, UNDP, Human Development Report 1992, Oxford University Press, N. York, 1992, p. 32 and A. Bhalla and Fr. Lapeyre, “Social Exclusion Revisited, Towards An Analytical And Operational Framework,” Paper for the International Symposium “From Social Exclusion to Social Cohesion”, Roskilde University, Denmark, 2-4 March 1995, International Institute for Labor Studies, Geneva, February 1995, tables 3 and 4.

[46] T.  Vanhanen, The process of Democratisation: A Comparative Study of 147 States, 1980-1988, Crane Russak, N. York, 1990, see, esp., pp. 48 ff., 167, 195.

[47] Cf. M.Poppovic, P. S. Pinheiro, “How to consolidate Democracy? A Human Rights Approach,” International Social Science Journal, 1995.75, p. 78.

[48] Arat, Z.F. ,Democracy And Human Rights In Developing Countries, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1991, pp. 4 ff.

[49]  As adopted by the UN World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993.

[50]  Preamble UN World Conference on Human Rights.

[51]  UN World Conference on Human Rights, section 8. Cf. also the Draft declaration and draft program of action of the UN World Conference of Copenhagen (A/CONF.166/1 of 2 February 1995): “ 4.   We are convinced that democracy and transparent and accountable governance and administration in all sectors of society are indispensable foundations for the realisation of social and people centered sustainable development.”

[52] UN World Conference on Human Rights, sec. 5. See also the sections 32 (“The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms the importance of ensuring the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of the consideration of human rights issues”).

[53] The Declaration of UN General Assembly on Social Progress and Development (1969) proclaimed that the right to development is a right of "every human person and all peoples"and added that "equality of opportunity for development is a prerogative both of nations and of individuals".

[54] For a critical presentation of these rights, see, among others, J. Rivero, Libertés Publiques, PUF, Paris, 1985, pp. 133 ff., C. Leclercq, Libertés Publiques, Litter, Paris, 1991, pp. 62 ff.

[55] See Human Rights and Development, United Nations Department of Public Information,  DPI/1275-92868-November 1992. Cf. also the art. 1 of the UN Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966).

[56] This is a common problem with almost all the rights of the third generation. See, for a further discussion, R. Pelloux, Vrais et faux droits de l’homme, RDP 1981.53.

[57] As  M. Poppovic and P. S. Pinheiro remark (How to consolidate Democracy? A human rights approach, International Social Science Journal, 1995. 75, p. 80), at the global level, the lack of regulatory mechanisms and the inequality between poor and rich countries results to even bigger and self-perpetuating inequalities: between 1960 and 1989,  the wealth of the richest 20 per cent of the world population is growing 2.7 times faster than this of the  bottom 20 per cent. In 1989, the richest 20 per cent of  the world's population received 60 times more than the poorest 20 per cent (an estimated l50 to 1 when income distribution is taken into account. (Cf. UNDP, Human Development Report 1992, Oxford University Press, N. York,1992). In consequence, the external debt of developing countries has multiplied thirteenfold in the last two decades: from $100 billion in 1970 to $1350 billion in 1990. They argue that “the vision according to which the mechanism of international trade, development finance and technology transfer would automatically transmit growth from the industrialised countries to developing countries has proved to be unrealistic and erroneous”.

[58] Section 5, e of the Resolution 47/1992 of the UN General Assembly. To similar conclusions arrived the UN World Conferences on Environment and Development (Rio, 3-14 June 1992, see especially the  Section I,  Chapter 2 and 3 of the Report),  on Population And Development  (Cairo, 5-13 September 1994,  see the Chapter III of the Program of Action) and on Social Development (Copenhagen, 8-12 March 1995). To the notion of the “sustainable development” is referring also the EC White Paper on growth, economic efficiency, competitiveness and employment,  COM(93) 700 final, Brussels, 5 December 1993. See also the Symposium of UNESCO, “What happened to development?, June, 18-19/5/1994, Paris, UNESCO Publications, 1995.

[59] Paragraph 26 c of the draft Declaration, A/CONF.166/1 of 2 February 1995.