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Created: February 11, 2003
Latest Update: February 11, 2003
jeannecurran@habermas.org
takata@uwp.edu

Situating Shuttle Flights and Space Stations

Site Copyright: Jeanne Curran and Susan R. Takata and Individual Authors, February 2003.
"Fair use" encouraged.

This essay is based on the Scientific American editorial , February 7, 2003, by By John Rennie, editor in chief, Scientific American, on the Columbia Disaster. Backup.

John Rennie has raised some interesting questions about how time and changing political and scientific policies distort agendas on which we thought we were clear. The shuttle was originally envisioned as a way to deliver astronauts to a way station from which they hoped to explore Mars. Over time that changed, and over time the agenda became scientific experimentation closer to Earth. But Rennie tells us that there were those who latched on to the idea of space tourism, to make a profit that might support the space program.

Rennie describes the changes cobbled onto the Columbia as we dealt with the realities of lived experience and paying for a very costly program. Were we to stick with pure science? Exploration in the interest of pushing back the frontiers of scientific knowledge, knowing that someday, somehow this explosion of knowledge would be of benefit to manking? Or were we to be practical and seek self-supporting programs, by such things as allowing persons on board who would capture the public's interest and increase enthusiasm for the program, and or allowing more practical experiments aboard for which private enterprise was willing to pay.

Rennie reviews all this in this commentary in terms of how our ambiguity in what goals we sought to accomplish led to a kind of haphazard adaptation of the shuttle to each new use that seemed able to pay its way, either in scientific knowledge, in popularity, or in direct marketing. Rennie concludes that such haphazard adaptation of instruments as costly, delicate, and complex as the shuttle increases the risk of error and accident and tragedy. Thus, he rightly suggests that we are complicit in the increased risk to future astronauts if we fail to insist upon a reexamination of our goals and the permissible risks of harm that may accompany them.

It occurs to me that the different perspectives of pure science, of public relations in support of science, and of direct marketing are not perspectives that are likely to be fully cognizant of each others' goals and reasoning. Neither would I expect the military aspects of space goals to be readily apparent to any of us. That suggests that what Rennie is proposing is a time for illocutionary discourse on space and its role in our lives.

Discussion Questions

1. Where does to "knowingness" fit into this?

   Consider that each group representing a different perspective and goal is likely to "know" a great deal about it's goal, and to assume that such knowledge is self-evident and compelling.

2. How could the history of the shuttle illustrate some of the problems of "knowingness?"

   Consider that in making us aware of the shuttle's history, Rennie is clarifying the different perspectives, so that we can understand better how some of their agendas will clash. What about the safety statistics? What do they really tell us?

   They tell us that 0.7% of the astronauts have been killed through such tragedies as that of the Columbia. What they do not tell us is how reasonable that percentage loss is, and they do not tell us whether the knowledge and experience we are gaining is worth such loss. Numbers cannot tell us that. Only a solid examaination of the perspectives of all groups concerned with the space program can begin to sort out the real costs and our need to bear them.

3. Who do you think should be having illocutionary discussions on these issues? Are there basic misunderstandings at issue?

   Consider which groups have interests in space. Consider then whether there are any conflicts among these interests. And consdier the difficulty of resolving such conflicts when we have never really dealt with the social issues of the role science should play.

4. Rennie says the Apollo missions didn't render much of scientific importance at first. How long should we pursue that which doesn't seem to be producing the effects we wanted? How does this relate to "pure science?" How does it relate to "knowingness?"

   Consider that experimentation takes learning. We improve as we go along. Remember the Hubble Telescope. So one cannot measure success by production except over time. How long? No one knows. But pure science takes time. It's not about immediate application. That doesn't mean it can be ignored. In terms of "knowingness," consider how uncomfortable the ambiguity of experimentation is going to feel to the investor who wants a guaranteed return.