University of Wisconsin, Parkside
Latest update: January 16, 1999
Faculty on the Site.
California State University, Dominguez Hills
University of Wisconsin, Parkside
Latest update: January 16, 1999
Faculty on the Site.
Courts are the final arbiters and interpreters of the law. But even courts have established rules of interpretation. These are called standards. You can spot a standard in an opinion by words like "this court must," "we are required to." Courts are fully cognizant of their power as final arbiters and do not readily acknowledge limits to that power. Only law can dictate limits to the courts. Standards, requirements for interpreting facts under given circumstances represents one such limitation.
There are special standards to which an appellate court must adhere in reviewing the judgment of the court below. Some of these standards will come up in our cases. They are set forth here:
Case authority: People v. Williams (1988) 88 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2184, 2188 Fifth Appellate District .
"We recognize the substantial evidence rule dictates we must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below and sustain that judgment if there exists evidence to support which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)"
This is a tough standard. Hard to get a reversal under this standard. The Williams court, however, does reverse under this standard.
This standard is very similar to the substantial evidence rule. The court must rule the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment below and sustain the judgment below if any reasonable person could have come to the same conclusion as the trier of fact. One reason this is such a difficult standard to beat is that reasonable persons disagree on almost everything.
You will often see words like, "we are not permitted to substitute our judgment for the judgment of the court below." That means that if reasonable persons could disagree, the judgment of the lower court stands. Only if the appellate court concludes that there is no reasonable way for the lower court to have reached its conclusion can the judgment be reversed.
One reason for such a tough standard is that it is a general policy of the courts not to rehear and reassess facts at the appellate level. The appellate court hear issues of law. If the higher court were to reverse a judgment merely because it disagreed with the lower court, it would essentially be reevaluating the facts. That could go on forever. Judgments must be final. So only matters of law may be addressed at the appellate level.
ase authority: Williams, supra. at 2188.
"We recognize as well that we do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. However, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment does not require us to limit our review to the evidence favorable to respondents. [Johnson, supra, at 577]".
For additional discussion see Harmless Error in this studyguide.
Case authority: People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d at 836, 299 P.2d 243.
When state law alone has been violated a state is free to apply its own harmless error rule. (Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 791, 17 L.Ed.2d 730.) Our state Constitution, article VI, section 13, as interpreted by the California Supreme Court defines the test as follows: "That a 'miscarriage of justice' should be declared only when the court, 'after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,' is of the 'opinion' that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error." (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836, 299 P.2d 243.)
People v. Crowder, (1982) 136 Cal.App. 841, 186 Cal.Rptr. 469. pp. 12-13
The Crowder court found that the error was harmless because there was actual observation and corroboration of Crowder's telephoned prescription, of the doctor's denial of having telephoned it, and of witnesses who saw Crowder pocket the prescription bottle. These observations were sufficient without the illegal seizure of the actual prescription bottle once Crowder had pocketed it.
Annotations on failure to suppress evidence as harmless error: 30 ALR3d 128 and 31 L.Ed.2d 921. Reference to both annotations can be found in the Texas v. Brown annotation in your reference materials. If this Court upholds the finding of the court below on probable cause, then Allwell could have been held for the police, the police could have arrested him, and the cocaine would have been discovered in a booking search.
Doctrine of inevitable discovery as it fits into harmless error doctrine.
This doctrine says that evidence which would normally have to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule may be admitted, if it can be proven by the prosecution (beyond a reasonable doubt?) that the evidence would have been discovered by the police through other legal means. Case authority: Brewer v. Williams, the "Christian burial speech" case.
Translated: In the Zelinski case, if Zelinski had been merely held for the police, based on the guards' observations, and booked for petty theft, a booking search would have turned up the heroin. So the question turns on whether there was enough "other evidence" to hold for detention under merchant's privilege. In our case, Allwell, the question turns on whether there was enough "other evidence," overhearing the conversation of the DEA agents, seeing the glassine packet, etc. to hold Allwell under Citizen's Arrest. If there were, then you could argue the doctrine of inevitable discovery.
In the "Christian burial speech" case, the police talked a suspect into leading them to the body of a ten-year-old girl he had murdered on Christmas Eve. The police knew that the man was very religious. Right to counsel had been invoked by his attorneys, and the police knew they could not question him without his attorney being present. But, in driving him back to the jail, one policeman said to the other, "Those parents are entitled at the least to a Christian burial for that child." The man led them to the body. Because the transaction was a violation of constitutional rights by police, the evidence of the body was suppressed. No evidence of a body. No murder conviction. To get a conviction, which the prosecution did, there was a new trial in which the prosecuting attorney had to prove that police, through an independent search procedure, would have found the child's body before it could have been covered by snow. Then they could introduce the evidence of a body. Conviction. This is what is meant by the doctrine of inevitable discovery.