[Lecture One]

ETHICS and AN INQUIRY INTO MORALITY

© 1999 by Eiichi Shimomissé

INTRODUCTION

There are many definitions of the nature of philosophical inquiry into morality or ethics. Ethics or moral philosophy is an inquiry into the nature of what makes a certain action morally worthy and to be commanded, that is, the nature of what makes a certain human action the action which ought to be. Where does this ought (moral oblligation) come from?

In ethics, the most basic questions may sound like, “What is the ultimate good that we are to strive for?” “Why and how should I choose this act rather than the other?” How (by what kind of criterion) can I resolve this moral dilemma?” “Why ought I do not only a morally good action, but the morally right action?” Lastly, “why should we act morally?” or “why should we be moral at all?”

To these questions, in the history of humankind, many moral theories were proposed which were supposed to provide the answers. These moral theories attempted to understand why we ought to act morally, and “explain” it so it would make sense. (This naturally presupposes a kind of reductionism ?metabasis eis allo geno.” In words, to explain means to comprehend a certain phenomenon by means of some other phenomenon. However, we do not discuss this until later.)

We also discover that, in the history of humankind, each and every society did and does and will appear to actually provide a set of certain rules of conduct and those of desirable actions, which seem to have “power to command” us to conduct accordingly.

There are two kinds of relativists regarding ethical theories. The first one is called the ethical relativist, who maintains that the ultimate principles of moral conducts are not one, but many and they are relative to certain cultures.

The other relativists mya be called anthropological relativists, who hold that, while they do not deny absolute morality, in actual society all rules of conducts and rules of how to will “good” deeds are relative to a given society itself.

The relativists both in value theory and ethics, therefore, contend that any and every moral command or rule is relative to a given society. Thus, they dispose us with the responsibility to understand and explain how any moral command is based on something else. It may very well be the positive laws, the desire of the despot, God’s command, presumably a certain social contract (this is normally an ungrounded hypothesis, although it could be demonstrated correctly), or the status of a human person (e.g. a slave ought to follow the order of his master), etc. On the other hand, there are others who maintain that positive laws, or the social mores of a given society, are bases for moral commands and obligations, but they must be founded, rather, on morality itself.

These relativist’s views, however, fail to have us understand the meaning of the ought, as their attempts may easily be shown as “circular.” This vicious circle occurs when “ought” is explained by “fact” whereby this “fact” already presupposes “ought” itself. Let us take an example for this situation: When we say, “perjury is wrong. We should not perjure ourselves!” From the point of the positive law and the legal system, we accordingly assume that purjury is indeed legally wrong and a crime, because to tell a lie is morally wrong. On the other hand, unless there is the comprehension of moral ought so-to-speak by itself, we say that we should not lie, bcause the law says so. Or because society and its preservation demands it, we sould not tell a lie. Although this is only one example, there are innumerable cases where such a circularity is invovled. This is the main argument advanced by Kant and G. E. Moore that demanded not a naturalistic position, but the philosophical basis, which we shall see later in the second half of this class.

When we confuse factual moral values and commands with those of universal ethical values and commands and fail to see the differences between them, we pursue, strictly speaking, inquiries in cultural anthropology rather than ethics. The latter deals with the question which asks how, in in a given society, moral values and commands appear as being in concrete practice.

On the other hand, when we look at textbooks in ethics, they present a variety of moral theories, which were proposed by some philosophers and were also put into practice. In the wider sense of moral philosophy or ethics, an inquiry into these theories from the philosophical point of view may also be regarded as tasks of our moral philosophy. The first third of our study will be allotted to understanding these so-called traditional and modern moral theories and critically appraising whether or not they indeed deserve to be called ethics in the sense that they are able to explicate philosophically the nature of ought.

Therefore, in our ethical inquiry, we are expected to asks questions about two rather independent, and yet mutually deeply related goals of moral theories: In ethics, a) we try to elucidate the nature of value (good=moral value), b) to articulate the correct definition of the morally right action, and ultimately disclose the groundwork on which ethics and moral obligation are based. The last attempt Kant called the metaphysics of morals. In the 20th century, such attempt was called by Max Scheler the groundwork of ethics and value theory.

Therefore, we may say, too, that the most fundamental questions which the moral philosophers must pursue are 1) clarification of the nature of good or value, which is the philosophical revelation of the nature of “ought,” and 2) the elucidation of the criterion for the morally right action.

Sophists’ Denial of Moral Philosophy in General

Indeed the Sophists, who did not form any particular school or doctrine, appeared before Socrates and were the contemporary group of philosophers who focused philosophical attention to and inquiry into the inquiry of human affairs instead of nature and the universe. They were well travelled in different areas, both in Greece as well as other countries, and were keenly aware of the significance of language and its investigation. They were cultural anthropologists, lawyers and unequivocally knew that what they had experienced is always relative to a given society and culture. Thus they were not only relativists, but also clearly realists in the sense that they only recognized those which were known and actually experienced. Once they considered that according to their viewpoint, what was to be not only is, but also ought to be factual and therefore relative to a given culture or group, the ideal or that which ought to be was considered meaningless or at least had no significance or implication in reality. Thus, it is easy to see that the Sophists tried to explain what ought to be in terms of what is, take for example, by religious commands (the Ten Commandments in Judaism and Christianity, for example) , by laws and rules of the given country or civilization (e.g. the law of “quid pro quo,” murder, theft, breaking a contract, etc.), or by what was considered “desired” (they did not even want to recognize “desirable”) among the members of the group (e.g. “happiness,” “wealth,” “health,” “honor,” “political power,” etc.). In other words, in and by itself, the Sophists denied the validity and uniqueness of being of what ought to be or what ought to be done. According to the Sophists, it is reducible to (explainable by) something else such as that mentioned above.That is, the Sophists attempted to understand the unique phenomena of what ought to be or what ought to be done by means of certain naturalistic characteristics of the society (the basis of the positive laws such as Divine Commandment, Ruler’s power, need of the coherent society, etc.), of human dispositions (desire, pleasure). Here for the first time, the realist’s viewpoint was advanced and the distinction between what is and what ought to be was thrown away as a unique contrast in philosophical inquiry and instead, the naturalist or realist attempts to comprehend what ought to be by what is. Needless to say, this necessarily led to relativism. There were always appraoches of the so-called eudaimonism.

Eudaimonism I

Socrates’ Philosophy of Morals
The first conscious and systematically attempted approach to moral question may be found in Socrates’ inquiries, although the position may not be so comprehensive. Socrates, like his contemporaries, believed that happiness (well-being--eu-- of the soul--daimon-- = eudaimonia) is the goal of all human activity. According to Socrates, however, the greatest problem of the human being lies in the self-conceit that one knows what happiness is. Socrates considered this to be the fundamental, human presumption that is to be overcome. The so-called Socratic Mission was to let people in general awaken from such a deep-rooted self presumption to search for wisdom, (which alone promises happiness in the most genuine sense.) In this case, unlike those philosophical positions in contemporary philosophy, wisdom (=sofia) is not limited to cognition of things, but rather the emphasis on obtaining and possessing wisdom lay in those of practical knowledge, the knowledge of morally good and right. Therefore, Socrates naturally contended that once one “knows” what is good (=what ought to be done), one cannot but do this good. Thus according to Socrates in the Apology, being ignorant of (moral) wisdom, one cannot even do evil or harm to an other. He or she is consequently free of moral charge. When Socrates in the Apology said, “You Athenians, who are known in excellence, are you not ashamed of yourselves to not pursue the virtues of the soul rather than fame, wealth and reputation?” Those people who pursue wealth, fame or reputation as the means to happiness are, according to Socrates, blind and totally ignorant of what virtue is and what wisdom is.

Consequently, those who interpret Socrates’ position as intellectualism fail to see this. Intellectualism signifies the knowledge of things and not the knowledge of practical matters and morally good, etc.

Socrates taught that, indeed when properly understood, virtue (arhth) is simply that trait of character upon which the achievement of the good life (eudaimonia=the well-being of the soul) depends. He further taught that the highest virtue is indeed the explicit pursuit of knowledge (filo-sofia=philo-sophia). This explicit pursuit of knowledge and wisdom may be made possible by knowing one’s own ignorance within oneself. In other words, happiness (the well being of the soul) not only depends on the highest virtue?philosophy (the pursuit of knowledge), b ut they are inseparably one and the same.

The pursuit of knowledge as the highest human virtue is an intrinsic value, the good pursued for its own sake. This contention superficially appears to be inconsistent with the above interpretation of the basic thesis of “eudaimonism,” namely it purports that happiness is the ultimate goal of all human beings, whereby some instrumental good such as pleasure, honor, wealth, or the serenity of mind, when pursued, results in happiness.

Let us examine this problem here. Wisdom and its pursuit are from Socrates’ viewpoint not mere means to happiness different from this wisdom and its pursuit, but closer examination reveals that wisdom and happiness are one and the same. This is a very unique philosophical approach which was not followed by his students except Plato and possibly Aristotle.

At any rate, Socrates was the very philosopher who advocated a certain philosophical conviction (to pursue wisdom) and actually lived his life by that philosophy.

Eudaimonism II--Hedonism:

Before we advance further, it may be necessary to make the meaning of hedonism clear, for the term hedonism has been very popular and we use it in ambiguous (more than on meaning) ways. The “moral” doctrine called “hedonism” is indeed one of the so-called major positions among different kinds of eudaimonism. Hedonism is a doctrine which is based on the Greek concept of hdonh-- hédoné=sensuous pleasure and contends that since happiness is the goal of our human life, we must seek it in the means of obtaining and enjoying pleasure and avoiding pain, whereby there is no qualitative difference among pleasures. Thus, to a hedonist, the pleasure derived from the satisfaction of a delicious meal is not different from the pleasure of the search for wisdom or the pursuit of knowledge (philosophy). Secondly, since there is no qualitative distinction among pleasures, the sole distinction which interests us is that of quantity, namely it matters how much (quantity) we have and enjoy pleasure. The hedonism considers further that the quantity of pleasure must be understood and explained by the intensity of pleasure. According to Hedonism, therefore, the quantitatively more (intensive) pleasure we have, the happier we shall be.

Hedonists maintain that while most moral virtues are to be learned to “be fond of” and pursue, pleasure is natural and is a very strong inclination that we do not have to command ourselves by “moral ought.” Thus, they contend, it is rather foolish and meaningless to command ourselves to cultivate other moral virtues (which are unnatural almost by definition of “moral ought”) and to perform in accordance with those virtues.

On the contrary, the most important thing, namely what is “morally right,” as understood by the hedonist is to know and try to attain quantitatively maximum pleasure (which is explained as the most intensive) and avoid any possible bodily pain and distress or turmoil of the soul. The quantity of pleasure and pain not only refers to “intensity”, but also sometimes to their “duration.” This shift of the hedonist’s quantitative emphasis from “instantaneous intensity” to temporary duration as the quantitative maximum indeed allowed a sophisticated form of hedonism to be developed by Epicuros.

Thus, hedonism may be defined as the moral doctrine to advocate the thesis, according to which, that what is “morally right” is to be pursued to its maximum, i.e., as either the instantaneously most intensive pleasure of the senses, or of temporary duration in order to obtain happiness, the ultimate goal of the human-being. It is thus important to take into consideration that the quantity of pleasure accommodates not only the instantaneous intensity of pleasure but also temporary duration of pleasure, which will later lead to opening the eyes of the hedonist to the qualitative differences among pleasures (like in John Stewart Mill’s case).

This is not the place to systematically criticize hedonism as a moral doctrine. However, you may find in yourselves easily some faults of this position. For example, it is obvious to any intelligent, sensible human-being that there are differences among different pleasures, as John Stewart Mill said, “I would rather be a hungry Socrates than a satisfied swine.”

It is also obvious to most people that frequently after one intensively pursued pleasure of the senses, we in fact experience pain and even annuli accompanied by pleasure. Sometimes, one may even suffer financial disaster and profound disappointment.

Two Representative Hedonisms: Cyreniacs Epicurianism

(a) Aristippos and The Philosophy of Cyreniacs
Aristippos of Cyrene was one of Socrates’s students (that is why we call him one of the small socratic schools in distinction from Plato and Aristotle). Cyrene is a Greek colonial city state in northern Africa on the Mediterranean coast with mild weather and considerable material wealth.

After the death of Socrates, Aristippos wandered around in Greece claiming to possess “wisdom,” and taught such “wisdom” to the youth of the wealthy, ruling classes with “very high tuition,” but later settled down in Cyrene and founded the school of Cyreniacs. Aristippos advocated a very radical form of hedonism.

Socrates taught indeed that, when properly understood, virtue (arhth) is simply that trait of character upon which the achievement of the good life (eudaimonia=the well-being of the soul) depends. He further taught that the highest virtue is indeed the explicit pursuit of knowledge (filo-sofia=philo-sophia). In other words, happiness (the well-being of the soul) not only depends on the highest virtue, philosophy (the pursuit of knowledge), but they are inseparably one and the same.

Thus, Socrates indeed advocated and practiced that the “wiser” (i.e., the more pursuits) one gets, the happier (well-being of the soul with intrinsic joy of such pursuit) one gets.

Aristippos observed that Socrates did not adhere to any wealth, good clothes, fame, position, nor had he any concern about trivial everydayness, but Socrates, with his simplicity of life, lacking pretense and snobbery, was joyful, accepted invitations to feasts, and other joys of life. From these two mentioned above about Socrates, Aristippos concluded the following from Socrates’ basic insight that the better you are, the happier you are: instead of this Socratic insight, he contended that the better time (happier) you have, the better (morally better and even morally right) you are. For it is natural not only for human beings, but also for the rest of the animals to pursue pleasure and avoid pain and suffering.

Aristippos contended further that our life is finite and short. Indeed, we cannot live it in the past, nor can we live it in the future, but only in the present. And yet, the present or “now” is at this very time here. Instead of pursuing and enjoying honors or wealth, and even the pursuit of wisdom, which either existed in the past or will exist in the future, what is available means at this very moment and here is indeed the enjoyment of sensuous pleasure. Therefore, Aristippos contended that one should enjoy the most intensive pleasure of this moment without worrying about the uncertain future or the past which is long gone.

(b) Epicuros and The Philosophy of Epicurianism
Epicuros from Samos, an island city state in Asia Minor, (341-270 B.C.) developed an interesting, rather moderate and philosophically acceptable moral theory based on hedonism. That is why perhaps when we talk about Hedonism, we think of Epicurianism, which is different from the rather naive, radical hedonism of Aristippos. His father had gone to Samos as an Athenian colonist ten years before Epicuros was born. Therefore Epicuros was able to retain the citizenship of Athens, thanks to this circumstance. Being an Athenian youth, Epicuros also had the obligation to serve two years of military service. So in 323 B.C.he went from Samos back to Athens at the age of 18 and completed this training in military service for two years. This was very a very turbulent period of Athens as a city state. Alexander the Great engulfed Athens and destroyed the basis of the city state, which was the indubitable basis for Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophical understanding of society and state. Some patriotic Athenians organized a revolt against Alexander’s Macedonian army, which turned out to be a complete failure. Epicuros participated in this revolt and had a bitter, disgraceful experience, which taught Epicuros quite well the futility of the political ambition.

Epicuros was well trained by proponents of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies (they both had died). At first he was quite critical of Plato’s philosophy, then later he dissociated from the philosophers of Lyceum. Nevertheless, he hardly acknowledged his learning from any of these and even later contended his scholarship was self-taught. According to some of the recent Epicuros scholars, he attempted a reform of moral philosophy with a new message of “philosophical salvation...”

Athens was, despite being in such political turmoil, still the cultural center of Greece. The Academy of the Platonists and Lyceum of the Aristotelians were still centers of philosophical activity. Quite independent of them, Epicuros gradually established himself as a philosopher and a teacher, and in 396 B.C. purchased a home in Athens with a large garden. Here he founded a new school of philosophy at the age of 36. Soon Epicuros and his school became known as the Garden of Epicuros with almost equal status with the Academy and Lyceum.

In contrast to the Academy and Lyceum, The Garden of Epicuros was known as the people of “good living” and “pleasant companionship” as well as their philosophical thought. It was also known that some of the fellows of The Garden were women as in the Pythagorean Cult. In either case, it was said that women and men are on equal basis in their associations. Epicuros was famous for his generosity (providing his private money as the means to maintain the Garden) and reasonsonableness.

Epicuros’s philosophy deals with one’s own very practical concerns, a way of living, not an abstract system of thought. Perhaps it may be said that the greatest appeal of Epicuros’ philosophy lay in its simplicity and common sense.

In fact, Epicuros defined philosophy as “the daily business of speech and thought to secure a happy life.” Furthermore, he had no doubt about the thesis that pleasure must be the major elements of one’s happy life. According to Epicuros, pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting point of every choice and every aversion, and to it we come back and make feeling the rule by which to judge every good thing....Wherefore we call pleasure the Alpha and the Omega of a blessed life.

Epicuros supposedly outlined his basic thought into forty Cardinal Principles, which were preserved by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers. The most interesting ideas on Epicuros’ hedonism may be found in his Letters rather than in his formal treatise. The best introduction to his philosophy may be found in his letter to Menoeceus, a young disciple to whom he is giving initial instruction in the way of life that will bring greatest happiness.

Let no one delay to study philosophy while he is young nor weary in philosophy when he is old, for no one is either short of age or past the age for enjoying health of the soul. And the man who says the time for philosophy has not yet come or is already past may be compared to the man who says the time for happiness is not yet come or is already gone by. So both the young man and the old man should philosophize (search for wisdom), the former that while growing old he may be young in blessings because of gratitude for what has been, the latter that he may be young and old at the same time because of the fearlessness with which he faces the future. Therefore the wise plan is to practice the things that make for happiness, since possessing happiness, we have everything and not possessing it, we do everything to have it.

Both practice and study the precepts which I contiguously urged upon you, discerning these to be the ABC’s of the good life. First of all, believing the divine being to be blessed and incorruptible, just as the universal idea of it is outlined in our minds, associate nothing with it that is incompatible with incorruption nor alien to blessedness. It is not the man who would abolish the gods of the multitude who is impious but the man who associates the beliefs of the multitude with the gods; for the pronouncements of the multitude concerning the gods are not innate ideas but false assumptions....

When.... we say that pleasure is the aim (of life), we do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in high living..., but we mean freedom from pain in the body and turmoil in the soul. For it is not protracted drinking bouts and revels nor ye sexual pleasure nor rare dishes of fish and the rest—all the delicacies that the luxurious tale bears—that beget the happy life but rather sober calculation which searches out the reasons for every choice and avoidance, and expels false opinions, the source of most of the turmoil that seizes upon the souls of men.

Meditate therefore by day and by night upon these percepts and upon the others that go with these, whether by yourself or in the company of another like yourself, and never will your soul be in turmoil either sleeping or waking but you will be living like a god among men, for in no wise does a man who lives among immortal blessings resemble a mortal creature.

Epicuros maintained that if the life which contains the greatest amount of happiness and the least pain should be every human-being’s goal, then by pursuing the impulsive pursuit of immediate and intense pleasure, such a life cannot be achieved. Although Epicuros believed that the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain led to the genuine greatest happiness to the human being, he also realized clearly the shortcomings and defects of Cyreniacs, which could not see the painful consequences of dissipation and overindulgence in the natural drive and pursuit of sensuous, immediate pleasure.

According to Epicuros, the ideal human being may be such a person that is indeed wise enough to avoid cheating himself with short-lived pleasures that cost too much, is prudent enough to choose simple pleasures that will endure longer and cost less, and intelligent enough to be free from all possible envy or ambition that would deeply trouble his soul.

For the genuine Epicurean, as Epicuros showed by leading his own life, such a person’s life is the “quiet, cultured life of a country gentleman, surrounded by congenial friends, far removed from the disturbing turmoil of politics or harassing anxiety of economic strife and competition.

This hedonism may be called more restrained, intelligent, prudent. In other words, Epicuros’ moral doctrine or his doctrine of how to live is rightly called the philosophy of living, or you may call it a pursuit of pleasure guided by reason and intelligence in that she/he is the master of his pleasure rather than blindly enslaved by intensity and glamour of the immediate, sensuous pleasures. Intelligence indeed controls emotion and desire, which allows this person to be genuinely free.

And again self sufficiency or self-contentment we believe to be a great good, not that we may live on little under all circumstances but that we may be content with little when we do not have an abundance, being genuinely convinced that they enjoy living most who feel the least need of it; that every natural appetite is easily gratified but the unnatural appetite is difficult to gratify. So plain foods bring a pleasure equal to that of a luxurious diet when once the pain due to need has been removed. And bread and water bring utmost pleasures when one who is hungry brings them to his lips.

Thus, the state of one’s own control of one’s soul in that it is freed from the blind thrust of sensuous pleasure and bodily ill and pain as well as the mental turmoil of everydayness. In other words, the tranquility of the soul and the health of the body must be the greatest happiness one is able to achieve as the highest good.

Therefore, it is said, ‘Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow you may die’ is really a travesty of Epicurianism, the revels in the Garden seem mainly to have centered on mathematics which can be pursued without emotional involvement and entail no hang-over...

Furthermore, Epicuros laid great emphasis on the pleasure derived from having a great friendship:

Of all things that wisdom provides for the happiness of life as a whole, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship. We ought to look around for people to eat and drink with, before we look for something to eat and drink; to feed without a friend is the life of a lion and a wolf.

The well-born man occupies himself chiefly with wisdom and with friendship; of these the one is a mortal good, the other an immortal good.

The significance of Epicuros: hedonism does not lie in the qualitative distinctions among pleasures, but rather, for example, friendship is so important and singled out not because pleasure of the soul is in itself superior to pleasures of the senses. All pleasures are, still according to Epicuros, equally good, qualitatively indistinguishable. According to Epicuros, it is the amount of pleasure that is important.

The intelligent hedonist simply seeks to secure for himself the most pleasure in life and the least pain. He will frequently choose to suffer momentary pain if it enables him to gain more lasting pleasure, and he will always avoid an over-indulgence of physical appetite or desire that brings an unpleasant consequence.The temporary pain of a surgical operation, for instance, is more

than compensated for by the permanently improved health it can produce. Epicuros describes quite explicitly the conduct that wisdom (fronhsis) dictates:

Even though pleasure is our first and native goal, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever but oftimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance issues from them. And oftimes we consider pain superior to pleasures, and submit to pain for a long time when it is attended for us with greater pleasure. While, therefore, all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is worthy to be chosen, just as all pain is evil but all pain is not shunned. It is by measuring one against the other and looking at the conveniences and inconveniences that all those matters must be judged...

Lucretius (96 - 55 B.C.)

He has been known as a Roman poet who is perhaps the most prominent follower of Epicuros in Ancient Rome. In fact, Epicurianism was greatly popularized by Lucretius’ poetry writings: De rerum natura. Lucretius’s masterful stylistic excellence helped a great deal that people were exposed to the philosophy of Epicuros in such a way that Epicuros was portrayed as the savior of humankind from superstitions and all the fears. Lucretius saw mainly in religion evils from which men and women were to be liberated by Epicurianism. This quasi-religious philosophical thought was supposed to protect people from tantalizing disquietude or anxiety, which, according to Lucretius, hindered their achieving happiness. Those evils, therefore, were to be conquered by philosophical insights. It is generally believed that Lucretius learned the epicurean philosophy from lectures on Epicurianism by Zeno (an Epicurean and not Zeno from Kition, the founder of Stoicism) and Phaidros. It is also believed that as to natural philosophy, Lucretius was influenced by the so-called Revivalist natural philosophers.

Epicurianism and Hedonism

. Hedonism always has had followers in the history of humankind, as perhaps not a theory of morality, but almost the justification of the pursuit of sensuous pleasure. As stated above, thanks to Lucretius, Epicurianism has been understood as synonymous with Hedonism, which we showed above as a misconception of Epicuros’ philosophy. This does not mean that Epicuros went beyond hedonism. On the contrary, Epicuros held the basic principles of hedonism to his heart and never left its turf. In comparison to Aristippos and his Cyreniac hedonism, Epicuros was above all a philosopher and made philosophical (and mathematical) investigations the basis for the pursuit of happiness. To Epicuros, indeed pleasure was what good is and the ultimate goal of human life. However, instead of the momentous intensity of sensuous pleasures, Epicuros found the maximum pleasures in those which would endure and even make us wise. In fact, Epicuros himself led the life of a philosopher which is free from bodily pain and from mental agonies and turmoil, enjoying the joy of friendship. He even advocated conscious mastery and control over one’s own pleasures. Thus, what one ought to do, or what is right action is to maintain the hermit like serene life liberated from physical displeasures and from the anxiety and agonies of everyday practical life.

Precisely because hedonism is a theoretical justification of our natural human inclinations (to pursue pleasure), we find hedonism not only in the West, but also in India and China.

As discussed later, hedonism is always associated with egoism (which purports that the criterion of right action is self-interest and the greatest gratification of one’s own self interest is considered the ultimate goal of life), that is, as long as hedonism asserts the pursuit of pleasure, the pursuit of pleasure is unfailingly associated with self interest.

In 18th and 19th century Western philosophy, an interesting modification of hedonism was proposed and obtained considerably wide acceptance, particularly in English-speaking cultures. This version, so-called universal hedonism, was developed and advocated by Jeremy Bentham. The basic principles of utilitarianism are: 1) the criterion for right action is the greatest pleasure for the greatest number of people, while 2) the good is indeed pleasure. As discussed later more extensively, Bentham devised the so-called hedonistic calculus in order to determine which is the right action (the right legislation) one should choose. He named this unique doctrine Utilitarianism (see his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislations.) Utilitarianism is hedonism and at the same time egoistic, although egoism is universalized to the greatest number of people who will have the greaatest amount of pleasure. (incomplete)